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INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I will briefly describe some of the more obvious
ways in which the jury has been considered a political institution.
I will then discuss the senses in which we can understand the term
“political” in the context of the American jury trial. I will describe
the senses in which Hannah Arendt, perhaps the most important
political philosopher of the twentieth century, tried to distinguish
between “the political” and the “the legal” and the limitations of any
such distinction. I will then turn to the heart of this Essay, a
description of the ways in which the American trial, as we actually
have it, is a political institution. I argue that attention to our actual
linguistic practices at trial reveals the jury trial to be a hybrid
institution, with aspects of traditional legal formalism, but one in
which the jury is finally asked to make what we may fairly call a
political judgment about what is most important in the case.
Finally, I will describe two recent important attempts to revive the
political dimension of the work of the jury in the context of criminal
law.
First, I address the nature of the question lawyers ask when we
ask whether the jury is a political institution. This sort of question
inevitably has both descriptive and normative dimensions. One can
describe the actual practices in which lawyers are engaged at trial.
Additionally, one can try to determine whether each of those
practices is consistent with something like the “true function” or the
“legitimate function” of the jury trial in the American constitutional
order. Lawyers’ practices may be consistent or inconsistent with
broader philosophical commitments—for example, the lawyer’s
preparation of witnesses or his ability to engage in a very minimally
constrained “free narrative” in his opening statement that defines
“what this case is about” in a way that appeals to a whole range of
norms, including those that may not be embedded in the “law of
rules,” as Justice Scalia likes to put it.1 However, I agree with the
proposition that those broader commitments should be generally
consistent with what John Rawls calls our “considered convictions
1. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187
(1989).
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of justice,”2 the specific determinations often embedded in institu-
tions and practices in which we have the greatest confidence. The
relationship between particular practices and broader philosophies
is normatively indeterminate, indeed circular. We may modify our
practices in light of our broader political philosophy or modify our
philosophy by careful attention to our actual practices. As is true at
trial itself, one achieves insight into these matters by “a continuous
dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the
most global of global structure in such a way as to bring both into
view simultaneously.”3 We can ask in a specifically doctrinal idiom
whether we ought to structure our trial practices so as to permit the
jury to engage in political deliberation at trial. Or, we can ask that
question in a more theoretical and normative idiom, in which case
we are best served through some attempt to reach what Rawls calls
“reflective equilibrium,” a (temporary) balance between our practices
and our broader self-understandings.4 My own inclination is
conservative in these matters because I believe that most of the
specific practices in which we engage at trial reflect a good deal of
inherited wisdom.5
I. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Here, I am not focused on making the case for the political
nature of the American jury through considerations of constitutional
history. The Founding Fathers’ understanding of English history
and their experience of the jury trial during the colonial period
convinced them that it was a key expression of American political
liberty.6 They embedded the criminal jury trial for federal prosecu-
2. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (1971).
3. Clifford Geertz, From the Native’s Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological
Understanding, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE 225, 239 (Paul Rabinow & William M.
Sullivan eds., 1979).
4. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 42-43.
5. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 74-75 [hereinafter BURNS, THEORY OF THE
TRIAL] (1999). I also believe that these practices are in reflective equilibrium with political
philosophies that I find compelling and in disequilibrium with those that I find unconvincing.
This does not preclude incremental reform of those practices. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE
DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 109-11 [hereinafter BURNS, DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL]
(2009).
6. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
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tions in the original Constitution and then, with a sharper geo-
graphical focus, in the Sixth Amendment.7 In enacting the Seventh
Amendment, which was extraordinarily important to the Anti-
Federalists, the first Congress reflected the view that juries would
act in political ways, different from the expected performances of
judges.8 The United States Supreme Court has held that the right
to a jury trial is a fundamental right for purposes of selective
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause,
addressing the jury’s institutional purpose “to prevent oppression.”9
In their magisterial study of the American jury trial, Kalven and
Zeisel found that the jury has acted in obviously “political ways,” for
example, to punish police misconduct.10 Akhil Amar has argued that
the jury trial is at the heart of the Bill of Rights and that the
broadly accepted notion that the jury ought to be the “judges of law,
as well as fact” reflects a conviction that the jury retained some of
the preconstitutional sovereignty of the people.11 This vision, in
Amar’s view, continues:
[E]ven today remnants of the Founders’ vision remain, in
doctrinal rules preventing judges from directing verdicts of guilt
or requiring special verdicts in criminal cases; barring trial
judges from reversing, and appellate courts from reviewing,
criminal jury acquittals; allowing criminal defendants to escape
government efforts to use collateral estoppel offensively; and
preventing challenges to inconsistent criminal jury verdicts.12
I believe that it continues in less overtly doctrinal ways, implicit in
the trial’s linguistic practices, many of which are incomprehensible
22-33, 87 (2000). In England, Lord Justice Devlin famously called the jury “a little
parliament[,] ... more than an instrument of justice and more than one wheel of the
constitution: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives.” PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY
164 (1956).
7. ABRAMSON, supra note 6, at 22, 27.
8. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN.
L. REV 639, 653 (1973).
9. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 155 (1968).
10. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 236-37 (1966).
11. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 96, 101-02 (1998); see also GORDON S. WOOD,
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 596-600 (1969) (arguing that the notion
of the sovereignty of the people was the distinctive contribution of American political theory).
12. AMAR, supra note 11, at 103-04.
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if the jury is understood solely to be a trier of fact in any simple
sense.13
Tocqueville is, of course, the classic theorist of the jury trial as
a political institution:
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communi-
cate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and
this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest
preparation for free institutions. It imbues all classes with a
respect for the thing judged, and with the notion of right. If
these two elements be removed, the love of independence
becomes a mere destructive passion. It teaches men to practise
equity; every man learns to judge his neighbor as he would
himself be judged .... The jury teaches every man not to recoil
before the responsibility of his own actions, and impresses him
with that manly confidence without which political virtue cannot
exist. It invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes
them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge
towards society; and the part which they take in the Govern-
ment. By obliging men to turn their attention to affairs which
are not exclusively their own, it rubs off that individual egotism
which is the rust of society.14
Although acknowledging the importance of the civil jury, this
commitment is even more poignant in the criminal context.
According to Tocqueville, “The jury is above all a political institu-
tion, and it must be regarded in this light in order to be duly
appreciated .... He who punishes infractions of the law ... is ... the
real master of society.”15
One can say much more about this history, as several of the
other contributions to this issue attest.16 In my view, however, it is
not ultimately significant, because the historical narrative may be
subject to competing interpretations and is subject to the kind of
circularity that the achievement of reflective equilibrium always
involves. The extent to which the civil or criminal jury should
13. BURNS, THEORY OF THE TRIAL, supra note 5, at 26-33.
14. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 265-66 (Henry Reeve trans., 1838)
(emphasis added).
15. Id. at 263-64.
16. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 6; AMAR, supra note 11.
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function as a political institution has been a contested issue over the
two hundred years of our history. The story can be told a number of
ways. It may be told as an assertion of the political jury as continu-
ous with the heart of the republican vision of the founders, a view
that Justice Brennan embraced in the context of civil cases in his
concurrence in Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v.
Terry.17 Alternatively, it can be told as the slow erosion of jury
authority in light of more “modern” understandings of the trial, in
which the “rule of law as a law of rules” is increasingly important.18
The latter argument would accept, either with joy or with resigna-
tion, the alleged normative significance of a more impersonal,
amoral, and increasingly global market economy that operates by
“systems imperatives” over which contextual moral and political
judgment should have no say. The question of the appropriate role
of the jury trial is intertwined with, and partially determinative of,
the best way to tell this historical story. I think there are better and
worse ways to tell the story, but that judgment is dependent on
political and philosophical judgments we must make today. Those
judgments should be keenly attentive to our considered judgments
of justice embedded in the actual practices of the American jury
trial.
A. Contrasting Senses of the Political
Discussions of the political nature of the jury can draw on quite
different understandings of that term. Of course, the jury trial is a
rule-bound set of practices. Those rules—rules of procedure and
evidence, on the one hand, and the rules that form the substantive
law and find their way into the jury instructions, on the other—have
authority because they have been promulgated by constitutionally
legitimate entities, courts and legislatures. These rules are what
make the trial what it is.  They are “constitutive rules,”19 of a public
nature. So in a trivial sense, jury trials are political processes
because they have been constituted by public institutions.
17. 494 U.S. 558, 580-81 (1990).
18. ABRAMSON, supra note 6, at 90-92.
19. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 31 (1955).
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But we usually mean more than that when we ask whether a
jury trial is a political event. A traditional, Aristotelian distinction
exists between political rhetoric and deliberation, on the one hand,
which are addressed to issues of expedience, even if in a very broad
sense, and forensic rhetoric and deliberation on the other, which are
addressed to issues of justice. Political deliberation at its best looks
to the future20 and, when successful, allows persons with quite
different perspectives and interests to continually reconstitute a
common project and their own political identity within that project,
but without ever surrendering their diverse perspectives. Political
ordering occurs without the need to achieve universally binding
norms or rules or a single authoritative vision.21 On the other hand,
justice is here conceived as commutative justice, in one way or
another restoring a participant to a legitimate status quo ante,
which had been disrupted by some illegitimate act.22 In this context,
juries act politically when they implicitly understand their task to
be concerned with the reconstitution of a common project and the
establishment of a public identity.
One can imagine jury deliberations including arguments that
have the form, again, usually implicit, “We are not the kind of
people who ...” or “I don’t want to belong to the kind of country that
...” If a jury acts politically in this sense, it may place these forward
looking norms in tension with the norms of commutative justice, or,
as we are more inclined to say, formal justice. The jury trial would
then involve resolving this tension in the particular case before it.
A jury would act politically not when it acknowledges the impor-
tance of the “rule of law as a law of rules” and the legitimate
expectations that the notion of the rule of law creates,23 but when it
implicitly balances those considerations against other values. The
jury’s verdict would then establish the relative importance of
competing values, but only in the dense complexity of a particular
case.
20. RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 7, 89 (1983).
21. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Ronald
Beiner ed., 1982).
22. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 120-23 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962)
(c. 384 B.C.E).
23. ABRAMSON, supra note 6, at 90-95.
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So the notion of the political that is usually in play in these
discussions relies on a set of contrasts, typically between the
political and the moral or the legal. All three of those terms are
subject to shifting meanings in particular contexts.24 One possible
contrast between the moral and the political, for example, is that
the former addresses issues of individual action, whereas the latter
is concerned with what Rawls calls the “basic structure of society,”
that is, “the way in which the major social institutions distribute
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of
advantages from social cooperation.”25 This basic structure is largely
embedded in, or at least supported by, legal rules and practices.
When a jury renders a verdict in a particular case, it is specifying
the meaning of the rules in which the basic structure is embedded.
This is a normative enterprise in which the basic structure is
continually reconstituted. This specification can be understood in
different ways, some of which are more consistent with “the rule of
law as a law of rules,” as an enterprise of law application, and some
more discontinuous and more political in the expanded sense of the
term described above. 
The contrast between “the political” and “the legal” can also be
shifting. A traditional understanding of legal, as opposed to
bureaucratic, processes is that the former is value defining.26 The
usually assumed legal agent here is the common law judge who
develops the law as he receives it, sometimes by modification and
sometimes by elaboration, which is an elusive distinction. Here, the
law exists in a never fully determined relationship among rules,
facts, and rationales in earlier cases. This notion finds its natural
home in historically conservative visions in which ultimate
norms—existing in some version of natural law, either absolute or
evolving—are slowly unfolded in the incremental decisions of the
courts. By contrast, in its ideal type, bureaucratic decision making
involves the instrumental application of rules to achieve wholly
predetermined “policy goals.”27 In a democracy, bureaucratic de-
24. See ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 1-31 (1977), for an excellent survey of
the dominant historical and contemporary senses of morality. See also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984). 
25. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 6. 
26. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 26 (1983).
27. Id.
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cision making is an exercise of state power to achieve purposes that
are expressions of public will.28 Certain understandings of legal
formalism come quite close to the ideal type of bureaucratic decision
making. They suggest that the judge should be wholly self-effacing
in decision making and, in particular, draw all the normative force
in decisions through a set of “legal technologies”—such as the
canons of statutory interpretation, which allow for the most
accurate possible discernment of public will, sometimes described as
“legislative intent.”29 The debates surrounding this formalist notion
of decision making as an ideal are well known. It is not entirely
incorrect to say that in this sort of contrast, legal decision making
occurs through a process of “right reason” and bureaucratic decision
making through the imposition of will. The political, in this vision,
is the realm of the will.30 In the polemical use of the term “political”
in the debates surrounding judicial “activism,” decisions that do not
attempt to derive all norms from an imagined will of the legislature
are deemed illegitimately political.31 
In the latter contrast, jury trial decision making, in my view,
falls on the side of norm-defining action, not on the side of bureau-
cratic or formalist determinations. There are, however, important
differences between what actually happens in the jury trial and the
ideal type of common law adjudication. Even in the more traditional
notion of adjudication, the assumption is that there is a bipolar
relationship between fact and norm, and adjudication involves the
elaboration of the authoritative norm, which exists in precedent or
statute.32 The realists largely rejected that notion and argued that
the factual “side” of the case carried with it some normative and, for
explanatory purposes, causal force.33 Cases were best understood in
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme
Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 48-54
(1997).
30. MACINTYRE, supra note 24, at 253-54. See also PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY
75-78 (2011), for an account that places will at the heart of legal decision making. 
31. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-41, 547
(1983) (arguing that statutes merely mark the line at which competing interest groups
temporarily came to rest and thus a judge should not attempt to engage in a normative
elaboration of the ideals implicit in a statute).
32. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
205, 218-19 (2001).
33. See id.
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light of the “situation types” they represented, and judges were
believed to “react primarily to the underlying facts of the case,
rather than to applicable legal rules and reasons (the latter figuring
primarily as ways of providing post-hoc rationales for decisions
reached on other grounds).”34 
I think that the realists were generally more right than wrong.
But much more should be said about the way in which the jury—or
the attentive judge in a bench trial—encounters the “underlying
facts of the case.” The “discipline of the evidence,”35 in Jeffrey
Abramson’s words, occurs through the narrative, argumentative,
and dramatic devices of the trial. In my view, it is a consciously
structured hybrid of languages and practices to which the jury
responds in its verdict and provides a range of normatively charged
narratives and argumentative devices that deconstruct those
narratives.
Let us recall very briefly how that occurs. The trial proper begins
with the opening statement of the plaintiff or prosecutor. The
construction of any such narrative requires literally hundreds of
simplifying judgments about selection, characterization, and
ordering, which effectively assign a human meaning to the events
being tried. The narrative tells the jury “what this case is about,”
whether or not the lawyer actually uses that phrase—many do. The
assigned meaning is rooted in the lifeworld of the jury. At their best,
opening statements avoid technical and bureaucratic language and
employ a “strong truth-bearing everyday language, not marred or
corrupted by technical discourse or scientific codes ... of which we
are in need as citizens, and as moral agents.”36 These narratives are
the means by which we may seek to restore the political and moral
coherence of a way of life after some disruptive event.37 Because
these narratives are generally woven around some notion of a
legitimate status quo and its disruption, they implicitly place the
jury within the story—one way or another, the lawyers appeal for a
restoration of legitimacy and ask the jury to take the steps to
34. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L . REV. 1138, 1148-49
(1999) (book review).
35. ABRAMSON, supra note 6, at 162.
36. IRIS MURDOCH, METAPHYSICS AS A GUIDE TO MORALS 164 (1992).
37. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 49-50 (1990).
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achieve that. This is quite distinct from—and much more a practical
and political task than—the task of a pure “finder of fact.”
The second opening statement dramatizes the reality that there
are two distinct factual and normative perspectives on “what this
case is about.”38 It begins the competition for the imagination of the
jury. The overall plausibility of the opening statements matter
because they provide the crucial lenses through which the contested
meanings and plausibility of each individual piece of evidence is
determined. Even an understanding of what each bit of evidence is,
how it should best be described, and what it means is dependent on
the factual and normative theory of the case into which it fits,
expressed in the opening statements. One opening is likely to be
more plausible than the other because it is more consistent with the
jury’s common sense, understood as an inventory of purely empirical
generalizations. Common sense, however, is also practical and
reflects moral and political convictions. The narratives honor “a
demand ... for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of real
events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral
drama.”39 I discuss this below. 
The opening statements are followed by the case-in-chief of the
party who bears the burden of proof. It is presented in a series of
direct examinations. Direct examinations occur through a series of
nonleading questions,40 which invite the witness to tell his own
story. This story, however, must be told based on his “personal
knowledge,”41 a term of art, which demands that the witness have
perceptual knowledge of that about which he testifies and that he
tells his story in the language of perception. The rules surrounding
direct testimony tend to produce a relatively detailed and concrete
account of some past event, of the sort we do not often hear in our
day-to-day lives. 
Direct examinations are followed by cross-examinations. Cross-
examinations often have a more logical or argumentative structure,
though they too may be used to create a counter-narrative to the one
that has been told on direct. They proceed with a series of short,
38. Trial lawyers like to say that “each fact has two faces.”
39. Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON
NARRATIVE 1, 20 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981).
40. FED. R. EVID. 611(c).
41. FED. R. EVID. 602.
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clear, undeniable propositions that suggest some inference that is
consistent with the examiner’s theory of the case. They show that
the detailed and perceptual story told on direct is, for all its Spartan
appearances, itself a construction. Thus, cross-examination can
apply a deconstructive shock to what initially appears to be a purely
factual account given by the witness. It can also show what the jury
may easily forget—that the plausibility of the account given is
dependent on the credibility of the witness. And so, cross-examina-
tion can deploy a dozen or so methods of “impeachment”42 which
may serve to suggest that there are reasons to doubt witness
credibility. These impeachment methods are applied diplomatically
and with attention to context across a broad continuum. They may
suggest at one end that the witness is making a sincere mistake,
completely understandable based on the witness’s limited ability to
observe. Further along that continuum, the cross-examiner may
suggest that the witness is, subconsciously or consciously, shading
his account because of his biases or interests. At the far end, the
cross-examiner may suggest that the witness is insincere and is
telling an outright lie. Redirect examination will seek to reconstruct
the witness’s initial story and restore what may be a tattered
credibility.
The first case is followed by the second, which is often followed
by the plaintiff ’s or prosecutor’s rebuttal case, and sometimes by a
surrebuttal case by the defendant. With the participation of the
parties, the judge determines what the jury instructions will be.
Closing arguments then follow, in which the lawyers now have the
benefit of knowing what the judge will tell the jury that the law
provides. In closing, the lawyers’ task is to try to coax the jury back
into accepting enough of the story told in opening statement to
justify a verdict. The advocates will argue the evidence and will
marshal the details that have emerged in the evidence that most
strongly support the case. A good closing will seriously address the
party’s own weaknesses and appeal to both logic and to moral and
political conviction to suggest that those weaknesses are relatively
insignificant. It will deploy analogies and metaphors, which often
have normative valence, to provide a lens to understand the broad
range of information to which the jury has been exposed. Good
42. FED. R. EVID. 607.
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closing arguments stay within the narrative theory of the case
offered in openings. They publicly “perform” the plausibility of that
narrative, attempting to ring true in this decidedly public forum so
that everything falls into place in the right way.43 And they seek to
coax the jury into wanting to rule in favor of the lawyer making the
argument. The relatively few rules that control closing also serve
implicitly to place the case in a public and political context. The
lawyer, not the client, addresses the jury. The lawyer is prohibited
from expressing his or her own personal opinion about the justness
of the cause or the credibility of the witnesses.44 In closing argu-
ment, private interest or desire must be justified in the language of
public right. 
By the time closing comes around, it will be apparent that the
openings were just a bit too coherent, that they did not quite fit all
of the evidence produced. This gap is one of the places where the
jury is required to exercise political judgment. At the very least, the
jury is forced to confront the relative seriousness of a mistake, a
failure to get it right, as to purely factual material or the moral and
political significance of the case. That is, I believe, definitely a
political function. The verdict is only rendered after a common
deliberation among the jurors, a deliberation that the jury under-
stands will follow the trial and in the shadow of which they have
heard all the evidence.
When one asks whether the jury is a political institution, one
may be asking whether it derives all of the norms by which it
decides the case from the legal rules that are given in the instruc-
tions, even if by elaboration of those norms, the jury’s usual
instruction—that it rely on its common sense and experiences in
life—is given a very narrow meaning, in which common sense is
only a reservoir of purely factual empirical generalizations. I believe
the answer is no. The legal rules are important in a number of ways,
but the vast bulk of any trial is spent on the dramatization of the
factual and normative conflicts about which any trial is concerned
and on increasing the level of tension among them. The release of
that tension occurs in a decision that determines, on a case-by-case
basis, what is most important about the matter being tried. That is
43. Accounts that ring true in individual conversation may not in a public forum.
44. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (1983).
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a political function, but it can fairly be called an appropriately legal
function as well. Because our legal cases not only adjudicate the
matter being tried, but also inevitably remake the basic structure
of society, the enterprise can fairly be called political. To put it
another way, all the narrative, argumentative, and dramatic
practices of the trial are sources of authority. They authoritatively
realize the common sense political and moral judgment of the jury
itself in a way that is continually in tension with the law of rules.
Kalven and Zeisel, for example, provide an inventory of examples in
which juries seem to consider factors that the law of rules would
render irrelevant: that the defendant was seriously injured at the
time of the crime; that the victim is unenthusiastic about prosecut-
ing; that the crime is so common; that neighboring states do not
consider the behavior to be criminal; that the defendant is unrepre-
sented; that he was suffering personal tragedies at the time he
failed to file a tax return; or that he used merely a toy gun in
committing a robbery.45
B. Hannah Arendt and the Political Nature of the Jury
Hannah Arendt was the most influential philosopher of the
political dimension of the human condition in the twentieth
century.46 In part, this was due to her conclusion that the absence
of mature political institutions and practices in Europe led to the
“totalitarian catastrophe” that engulfed Europe, which she barely
escaped.47 Her mature view was that such institutions and practices
could guard against the worst results of “the onslaught of moder-
nity.”48 For Arendt, the human condition embraces fundamentally
different modes of activity.49 When we engage in labor, we partici-
pate in the endless, and often exhausting, rhythms of life-sustaining
productivity; when we work, we create the stable world structures,
physical and otherwise, which house and protect us from nature;
when we engage in politics, for the first time we can enjoy public
45. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 10, at 270, 293, 301, 305, 319, 337-38 (1966).
46. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
47. HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOVERY OF THE PUBLIC WORLD 286, 292-93, 313-14 (Melvin
Hill ed., 1979). 
48. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 196, 199-200 (1965). 
49. ARENDT, supra note 46, at 7.
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freedom and engage in action.50 In political forums, we engage in the
“processes of persuasion, negotiation, and compromise, which are
the processes of law and politics,”51 and enjoy the “actual content of
political life—of the joy and the gratification that arise out of being
in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in
public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed.”52
The existence of a political dimension to the human condition allows
for an experience of meaningful life. It does not require the achieve-
ment of an Archimedean point from which to make judgments.
Rather, it recognizes the irreducible plurality of perspectives in the
public world, and frames its arguments according to the multiple
perspectives, each of which holds some power and is embedded in
our opinions, which exist there.
For much of her career, Arendt distinguished quite sharply
between the processes of law and those of politics. She largely
placed law in the sphere of “work,” that is, of creating and maintain-
ing the “stable worldly structure” within which we live and some-
times act.53 She appreciated the ability of the American founders,
alone among modern revolutionaries, to “found a new authority ...
to assure perpetuity, that is, to bestow upon the affairs of men that
measure of stability without which they would be unable to build a
world for their posterity.”54 She conceded that constitutional texts
have to be interpreted, but still believed that they, in conjunction
with accepted canons of interpretation, can provide some degree of
stability: a “house” within which political processes can go forward.
It is within this world that political action becomes possible, and
this stable structure can serve to protect life, liberty, and property
from tyrannical government. “Foremost among the stabilizing
factors, more enduring than customs, manners, and traditions, are
the legal systems that regulate our life in the world and our daily
affairs with each other.”55 In the context of the criminal law, she
emphasized the limitations of what law should seek to achieve:
“Lawfulness sets limitations to actions, but does not inspire them;
50. Id. at 7-9.
51. Id. at 82.
52. HANNAH ARENDT, Truth and Politics, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 263 (1977).
53. ARENDT, supra note 48, at 174.
54. Id. at 182. 
55. HANNAH ARENDT, Civil Disobedience, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 79 (1972).
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the greatness, but also the perplexity of laws in free societies is that
they only tell what one should not, but never what one should do.”56
She noted too that the obsessive concern of the criminal trial with
simple factual truth, regardless of the opinions of the participants,
celebrates what she calls a nonpolitical value.57 In decent societies,
one can see “the grandeur of court procedure that ... is concerned
with meting out justice to an individual, and remains unconcerned
with everything else—with the Zeitgeist or with opinions that the
defendant may share with others.”58 In short, constitutional law’s
concern for institutional stability pays homage to human plurality
and the criminal law’s concern for factual truth pays homage to
“those things which men cannot change at will,” which shows that
the political “sphere, its greatness notwithstanding, is limited—that
it does not encompass the whole of man’s and the world’s
existence.”59
Arendt’s concern for stability and for the values of individual
justice quite obviously spring from her experience of the legal world
of the Third Reich. For Arendt, “[p]ositive laws ... are primarily
designed to function as stabilizing factors for the ever changing
movements of men.”60 Under the Reich, in her wonderful phrase, “all
laws have become laws of movement.”61 Practically, this means that
decree followed decree and no one could depend on the stability of
any promulgated rule. In totalitarian societies, of the left or the
right, “the term ‘law’ itself changed its meaning: from expressing the
framework of stability within which human actions and motions can
take place” to the “expression of the motion itself.”62
Guilt and innocence become senseless notions; “guilty” is he who
stands in the way of the natural [Nazism] or historical [Stalin-
ism] process which has passed judgment over “inferior races,”
over individuals “unfit to live,” over “dying classes and decadent
56. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 601 (2004).
57. ARENDT, supra note 52, at 263.
58. ARENDT, supra note 55, at 199.
59. ARENDT, supra note 52, at 263-64.
60. ARENDT, supra note 56, at 597. 
61. Id.
62. Id. at 598.
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peoples.” ... Terror is lawfulness, if law is the law of the move-
ment of some suprahuman force, Nature or History.63
And so the importance of stability:
Positive laws in constitutional government are designed to erect
boundaries and establish channels of communication between
men whose community is continually endangered by the new
men born into it.... The stability of the laws corresponds to the
constant motion of all human affairs, a motion which can never
end as long as men are born and die. The laws hedge in each
new beginning and at the same time assure its freedom of
movement.64
Such “laws of movement” under the Reich emerged from a period
in which the judiciary had eschewed political decision making: 
[L]egal positivism, with its demand that judges be strictly bound
to the law, had been the unchallenged doctrine of the authoritar-
ian state under the kaiser. During the fourteen years of the
Weimar Republic, however, the judicial system and legal
scholars had assumed a position of decided coolness toward the
democratic government. Only a minority of legal theorists had
implored the judiciary to obey the laws of the democracy.65
In the twenties, courts and scholars began to embrace notions of
adjudication in which courts, including criminal courts, were free to
embrace political goals in individual cases.
The fundamental legal principle of Nazi dictatorship—“What-
ever benefits the people is right”—had been established by the
highest courts in the land five years before the Nazis seized
power, and National Socialist legal theorists liked to point later
to the decisive role played by the venerable Supreme Court in
creating “the new legal order, which has as its sole standard the
welfare and security of the German people.”66
63. Id. at 599.
64. Id. at 599-600.
65. INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE 219 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991).
66. Id. at 24 (quoting ALFONS SACK, DER REICHSTAGSBRANDPROZESS 94 (1934)).
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National Socialism found a generally willing audience in the
wealthy authoritarians who remained on the bench after the
Kaiser’s rule ended.67 The jury had been abolished in Austria-
Hungary in the later nineteenth century and was abolished in
Germany in the twenties.68 Soon “whatever benefits the people” was
given its meaning exclusively by the ideology of the ascendant
party.69 Carl Schmitt wrote in 1932 that “the era of legal positivism
has come to an end.”70 
The burning of the Reichstag [in 1933] had provided an excuse
for declaring a state of emergency .... What was actually decreed
was the loss of all personal rights during the Third Reich. The
freedom of the individual, the inviolability of the home from
unwarranted search, the privacy of the mails, freedom of speech
and assembly, the right to form organizations, and even the
right to own property were suspended “until further notice.”71
Schmitt again provided the rationalization:
Once this state of emergency has been declared, it is clear that
the constituted authority of the state continues to exist, while
the law is placed in abeyance ... The decision exempts that
authority from every normative restraint and renders it absolute
in the true sense of the word. In a state of emergency, the
constituted authority suspends the law on the basis of a right to
protect its own existence.72
67. See id. at 220.
68. Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135, 137 (1972).
69. Carl Schmitt wrote: “The whole of German law today ... must be governed solely and
exclusively by the spirit of National Socialism ... Every interpretation must be an
interpretation according to National Socialism.” MÜLLER, supra note 65, at 70 (quoting Carl
Schmitt, Nationalsozialismus und Rechtsstaat, 63 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 713
(1934)).
70. Id. at 219 (quoting Carl Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimitat, in 
VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE AUFSÄTZE AUS DEN JAHREN 1924-1954, at 344 (1958)). The latter
did not occur until that decree was canceled by the occupying powers in 1945. Id. at 47.
71. Id. at 46-47.
72. Id. at 46 (quoting CARL SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE 181-82 (2d ed. 1922)).
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In Ingo Müller’s words:
This passage shows that such ideas were developed long before
the Third Reich. Conservative German theories of constitutional
law had always reflected a fascination with authoritarian
government, and, in Schmitt’s words, “the nature of state
authority is revealed most clearly in the state of emergency.
Here the decision making and the legal norm diverge, and ...
authority proves that it need not have a basis in law in order to
establish justice.”73
In both the ordinary criminal courts and then to an extreme
degree in the informal People’s Courts that followed, the nature of
the trial was fundamentally transformed: 
Developed by German legal scholars, it was explained by
Heinrich Henkel, a professor of criminal law, as follows: “By
freeing ourselves from the notion of parties [to a lawsuit], we
free ourselves from the liberal notion of a trial as a conflict of
aims, an unleashing of a struggle to find the truth, which by its
very nature as a conflict between two parties makes finding the
truth difficult. We thus become free to set against the liberal
system of opposing forces a new order, in which the participants
have a unanimity of aim.”74
Given this background, there can be little surprise about
Arendt’s concern for law as providing protection for civil rights and
a relatively stable structure within which ordinary political
processes could go forward. That is why it is so remarkable that her
own American jury service convinced her that the jury trial in what
trial lawyers call “triable cases”—cases that have some level of
uncertainty about them—was indeed an appropriately political
enterprise: 
We have the last remnant of active citizen participation in the
republic in the juries. I was a juror—with great delight and with
real enthusiasm. Here again, all these questions are somehow
73. Id. (quoting SCHMITT, supra note 72, at 20).
74. Id. at 64 (quoting Heinrich Henkel, Die Gestaltung des künftigen Strafverfahrens, 40
DEUTSCHE JURISTEN ZEITUNG 531 (1935)).
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really debatable. The jury was extremely responsible, but also
aware that there are different viewpoints, from the two sides of
the court-trial, from which you could look at the issue. This
seems to me quite clearly a matter of common public interest.75
Arendt argued that the jury trial provided an example of the
kinds of issues that “really belong in a public realm” and is an
example “of the very few places where a non-spurious public still
exists.”76 It seems to me that what Arendt discovered in the
American jury trial was a political forum that did not have the
cancerous ideological character of the “post-positivist” German legal
system. In the American jury system, it was decidedly not true that
“all the laws are laws of motion.” The American trial’s “consciously
structured hybrid of languages and practices”77 itself provided the
necessary stability. And so legal positivism and formalism turn out
not to be the only protections for human decency and human liberty,
a judgment that the judges and thinkers of central Europe simply
did not have the political experience to make. 
II. THE AMERICAN TRIAL AS A POLITICAL FORUM
I have described at some length how highly constrained
language practices that prevail at trial concretely operate as a
recognizably political forum. An important part of this is, as Arendt
recognized, the manner in which those practices allow for the
multiplicity of perspectives. Those perspectives are placed in the
harshest tensions by the devices of the trial. The competing
narratives of opening statements allow the lawyers to appeal to the
whole range of norms that inhere in the jurors’ lifeworld, whether
they are explicitly expressed in the “law of rules.” The trial under-
stands that the attempt to understand human actions in themselves
and before the imposition of narrative categories will produce “the
disjointed [and unintelligible] parts of some possible narrative.”78
These openings express the organizing theory of the case proposed
75. Hannah Arendt, On Hannah Arendt, in HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOVERY OF THE
PUBLIC WORLD, supra note 47, at 317.
76. Id. at 318.
77. BURNS, DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL, supra note 5, at 183.
78. MACINTYRE, supra note 24, at 215.
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by each lawyer to the jury. Each seeks to convert the jury to his way
of seeing things. As Kuhn famously put it, even scientific theory
choice has this same characteristic—theory choice is the result of a
weighing of the relative importance of incommensurable values.79
Opening statements are addressed to the opinions of the jury, not
only their empirical generalizations, but “the culture’s beliefs and
working hypotheses about what makes it possible and fulfilling for
people to live together, even with great personal sacrifice.”80 The
choice between narratives signals to others what their public
identities are: “By his manner of judging, the person discloses to an
extent also himself, what kind of person he is, and this disclosure ...
is involuntary.”81 Because he is taking public action through public
institutions, the juror’s acceptance of one narrative over another is
inevitably a determination, in a strong sense, of his own public
identity and the identity of his community.82
What makes the trial powerful, however, is not simply the
counterposing of the competing narratives of opening statement, but
79. “[C]ommunication between proponents of different theories is inevitably partial, ...
what each takes to be facts depends in part on the theory he espouses, and ... an individual’s
transfer of allegiance from theory to theory is often better described as conversion than as
choice.” THOMAS S. KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in THE ESSENTIAL
TENSION 338 (1977) (emphasis added).
80. BRUNER, supra note 37, at 32. 
81. BEINER, supra note 20, at 18 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, The Crisis in Culture: Its
Social and Its Political Significance, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 223 (enlarged ed. 1968)).
82. Consider, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach. As Ronald
Beiner explains:
In deciding how to act well in a particular situation we draw upon an
understanding of ourselves and our historical situation, of who we are and what
ends we desire, and this necessarily entails an activity of interpretation. What
we are interpreting is ourselves, and the past and present social worlds that
make us what we are .... [W]e already possess a pre-understanding of our
historical identity and social relationships. This we get from our past, from the
cultural and linguistic traditions that compose our historical identity.
Id. at 19-20. Arendt also emphasizes the important relationship between storytelling and
community:
In this respect storytelling must be understood not just as the primary form of
thinking about experience, but also as the primary form of communicating with
each other about experience.... Stories tell us how each one finds or loses his just
place in relation to others in the world. And the communication of the story is
confirmed when justice has been recognized.... In enabling us to appreciate the
reality of what happens by means of storytelling, the imagination allows us to
take the world to heart, and do justice to the fact that we share it with others.
ARENDT, supra note 48, at 289-90.
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the tension between those narratives with the highly constrained
narratives of direct examination, provided in the language of
perception.83 The devices of the trial drive the mind toward an
almost obsessive concern with the details of the events being tried.
This serves to refine and elevate the public norms placed in play by
the opening statements.
When the jury makes a preliminary determination between
opening statements, it is choosing between two highly constrained
accounts. These constraints pull the accounts toward each other,
because they must anticipate each other’s best factual and norma-
tive considerations: toward the evidence, because the performative
element in opening statement is a promise about what the evidence
will show; and toward the law, because the lawyers must always be
concerned about the possibility of a directed verdict. This discipline,
and the extreme cognitive tension it generates, are precisely what
make the trial a “crucible.”84
The evidentiary phase of the trial inevitably shows that the
stories told in opening statement do not quite capture the concrete-
ness of the events on trial. This is what serves to refine the norms
on which the openings are based:
It is only when we are confronted by the demands of action in
the context of a particular set of circumstances that we get a true
understanding of what our ends really are, and reassess these
ends in relation to a new understanding of our life as a whole.
Action in the particular circumstances of life is a continuing
dialogue between what we think our life is about, and the
particularities of moral and practical exigency.85
This is the source of the elevation of juror capacities to which
they often testify. “[T]rials and their stories are the embodiment of
the law’s self-criticism,”86 but they also serve as the criticism of
commonsense moral norms. In a way Arendt would understand,
“[j]urors experience this actualizing of an often debased sensus
communis as a revelation, as they are offered a set of linguistic
83. See supra notes 38, 40-41 and accompanying text.
84. BURNS, THEORY OF THE TRIAL, supra note 5, at 176. 
85. BEINER, supra note 20, at 24 (emphasis added).
86. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 385 (1984).
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practices that is more demanding of and more adequate to the range
of their subjective capacities.”87 The judgment they exercise can
fairly be said to partake in what Sheldon Wolin has called “political
wisdom”:
Taken as a whole, this composite type of knowledge presents a
contrast with the scientific type. Its mode of activity is not so
much the style of the search as of reflection. It is mindful of
logic, but more so of the incoherence and contradictoriness of
experience. And for the same reason, it is distrustful of rigor.
Political life does not yield its significance to terse hypotheses
but is elusive, and hence meaningful statements about it often
have to be allusive and intimative. Context becomes supremely
important, for actions and events occur in no other setting.
Knowledge of this type tends, therefore, to be suggestive and
illuminative rather than explicit and determinate.88
The kind of judgment exercised by juries can serve our basic
political task “less to create constantly new forms of life than to
creatively renew actual forms by taking advantage of their internal
multiplicity and tensions and their friction with one another.”89 It
is not at all surprising that trial advocacy has been called “trial
diplomacy.”90 The lawyers speak to judge and jury in their plurality,
and must be respectful of opinions and perspectives they may not
share. This allows for trial lawyers to achieve “a certain ethical
value in so far as it means a testing of the player’s prowess: his
courage, tenacity, resources and, last but not least, his ... ‘fairness.’”91
A. Two Recent Calls for an Increasingly Political Role for the 
Criminal Jury
In The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, the late William
J. Stuntz offers a broad historical, empirical, and theoretical
87. BURNS, THEORY OF THE TRIAL, supra note 5, at 181.
88. Sheldon Wolin, Political Theory as a Vocation, in MACHIAVELLI AND THE NATURE OF
POLITICAL THOUGHT 23, 45 (Martin Fleisher ed., 1972).
89. DAVID KOLB, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE MODERNITY 259 (1986).
90. See e.g., ALAN E. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY (1971).
91. JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE 11
(1955). 
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analysis and indictment of our current criminal justice system.92 He
describes our response to the undeniable increase in the level of
crime in the United States during the sixties and early seventies.93
That response involved an increase in sentences, the almost
complete triumph of plea bargaining, and increased criminalization
of behavior.94 The result was an explosion in the incidence of
incarceration, with the currently astounding statistics indicating
that approximately one out of every one hundred Americans is in
custody and at vastly higher rates for African Americans.95 The era
also saw a change in the definition of crime, as crimes were defined
in a bright-line way, requiring the proof of ascertainable behaviors
with narrowly defined states of mind.96 Those definitions were
designed to remove from the “law of rules” most of the equitable
defense arguments that had prevailed in an earlier era.97 The
criminal law that prevailed during the early part of the twentieth
century was, according to Stuntz, characterized both by lenity and
by vagueness, often requiring proof of
an “evil-meaning mind” or a “vicious will,” as the law of criminal
intent required a century ago but rarely does today. In other
words, jurors were called on to decide whether individual
defendants deserved criminal punishment. Such broad jury
power made criminal trials morality plays, with jurors serving
as both judge and Greek chorus. In trials-as-morality-plays,
defendants could raise nearly any colorable argument in their
defense—defense arguments were not much limited by the rules
of criminal law, because criminal law was so un-rule-like.98
Juries still engage in a mode of decision making that is rela-
tively equitable rather than “rule-oriented,”99 but now they have to
wade against the current of the law of rules and instructions to
“follow the law whether [they] agree with it or not”100 in order to do
92. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
93. Id. at 244-81.
94. Id. at 257-62.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 139-40, 260-62.
97. See id. at 261-63.
98. Id. at 140-41. 
99. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 10, at 87. 
100. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106-07 (1895).
2014] THE JURY AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 829
so. Additionally, jury trials were enormously more common than
today, and acquittals were more common as well.101 Trials were also
relatively simpler.102 Today, prosecutors in the system exercise the
element of discretion to a greater extent at the charging stage than
do local juries after trial.103 It has become part of a much more
bureaucratized system in which the real power is in the hands of an
executive officer, under quite a different horizon and subject to quite
specific political and bureaucratic incentives.104 With regard
specifically to the length of sentences, “[o]ver the course of the past
few decades, prosecutors have replaced judges as the system’s key
sentencing decisionmakers, exercising their power chiefly through
plea bargaining. That prosecutorial power is unchecked by law and,
given its invisibility, barely checked by politics.”105 Stuntz’s
conclusion is that
[F]or all its complications and for all its vices, the justice system
of the Gilded Age North worked better than today’s more
bureaucratic system, and did so without today’s massive and
unstable prison populations. It seems more than coincidence
that northern criminal justice was also more locally democratic
than its counterparts today.106
Stuntz offers a broad range of correctives for the justice system:
“The goal must not be fewer prisoners alone, but fewer prisoners
and less crime—along with a justice system that seems more
legitimate to residents of high-crime, mostly black city neighbor-
hoods.”107 The broad means to that end? “The short answer is by
making today’s style of criminal justice more democratic.”108 In part
that means increasing the political role of the jury in criminal
justice:
101. STUNTZ, supra note 92, at 139.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 230 (2003).
105. STUNTZ, supra note 92, at 295. 
106. Id. at 142. 
107. Id. at 287.
108. Id.
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Without radical change in either substantive law or procedure,
the number of jury trials might be increased substantially, and
jurors might be given a larger role in resolving tried cases. Jury
selection might be altered so that juries better represent the
neighborhoods where crimes happen—the chief means by which
today’s justice system can be made more locally democratic, and
hence more legitimate in the eyes of those whom the system
targets.... Criminal law enforcement was once governed locally;
the residents of the neighborhoods most affected by it had a
large say in its size and character. Today’s justice system is
more centralized: state and federal officials, along with subur-
ban and small-town voters, have more power over urban
criminal justice than in the past, and residents of high-crime
cities have less. If anything about American criminal justice
needs changing, that does.109
Political scientist Albert W. Dzur, influenced by Hannah Arendt
and the classical American philosophy of John Dewey, offered a
similar prescription. He rejected the notion that increased levels of
democratic participation in the criminal justice area will result in
a higher level of “penal populism,” best symbolized by “three-
strikes” in California.110 Dzur cites Marc Mauer’s explanation for
growth of the penal state: “the loss of the individual in the sentenc-
ing process, as determinate sentencing and other ‘reforms’ have
taken us from an offender-based to an offense-based system.”111
Echoing Arendt’s notion of bureaucracy as “rule by nobody,”112 Dzur
concluded that “[t]hough mainstream American court process differs
in some respects from classic Weberian bureaucracy, it nonetheless
maintains core elements of modern organizations that weaken
moral responsibility for individuals and conceal the impact of laws
and policies on others’ lives.”113 With the advent of determinate
sentencing, the most important decisions about defendants’
punishments are made in the legislatures, at enormous distance
from the facts of the particular case. Talk not of people but of
109. Id.
110. ALBERT W. DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY 22-30
(2012).
111. Id. at 17 (quoting Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the
United States, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 9, 17 (2001)). 
112. ARENDT, supra note 46, at 40.
113. DZUR, supra note 110, at 17.
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“clearances, caseloads, dockets”114 distances participants from moral
evaluation. He cites Herbert Packer’s picture of bureaucratized
criminal justice as
an assembly-line conveyor belt down which moves an endless
stream of cases, never stopping, carrying the cases to workers
who stand at fixed stations and who perform on each case as it
comes by the same small but essential operation that brings it
one step closer to being a finished product.115
However, Dzur offers a hopeful view of the role of the jury:
By empowering outsiders, the jury trial injects a decalcifying
antidote into the circulatory system of modern criminal justice.
Pressing courthouse regulars to translate their language and
share their ideas and experiences with lay citizens, forcing
significant interaction between professionals and laypeople, the
jury renders transparent the complicated norms, rules, and
procedures best understood in practice.116
....
More important, by sharing responsibility for previously
official tasks, by incorporating a wider range of actors and
viewpoints into decision making, and by narrowing the distance
between system and lifeworld, officials are also at the same time
building more egalitarian and accountable institutions in which
the public has a stake.117
After all, the jury is “the last place in our institutions where the
people—any people—take a hand in ‘administering’ themselves.”118
Dzur paraphrased Tocqueville on the “rust of society”119:
114. Id. at 19.
115.  Id. at 101 (quoting HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 159
(1968)).
116. Id. at 102.
117. Id. at 77. 
118. Id. at 162 (quoting E.P. THOMPSON, WRITING BY CANDLELIGHT 107-09 (1980)).
119. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 14, at 266.
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Without attending such schools [of civic life], a person is unable
to conceive a public good that is different from his own interest,
is unable to recognize different but equally valid claims of
others, and perhaps most important, is unable to see others as
collaborators and allies in a collective project that depends for its
success on his public-minded action, but is stuck with disabling
default perceptions of a crudely Hobbesian social world consist-
ing only of competitors and rivals. Jury service is a liberation
from the servitude of private habit and routine that forestalls
possibilities of a better individual and collective life.120
Dzur is especially persuasive in his account of the ways in which
professional and lay participation in the jury trial increases the
quality of justice. He does not envision the jury in a state of
insurgent opposition to the professionals involved in the system. He
called the default attitude one of respect.121 Yet it is important, in
his view, for citizens to understand concretely what occurs in the
criminal justice system, for their own democratic education as
responsible participants.122 He echoed in a more theoretical idiom
what Stuntz argues in an institutional idiom, that courts should be
more “inclusive, communicative, deliberative, participatory, and
public.”123 Professionals are continually tempted to slide into a
purely instrumental rationality in their administration of the
system.124 The languages and practices of the trial, and the partici-
pation of laymen who are more likely to actually listen to them,
serve as an important antidote to this instrumental rationality.
Because the jury trial is public and dramatic, the lay jury is likely
to be absorbed in the very significant details of the particular
situation in a way that blunts the exercise of a purely instrumental
rationality. Even in the most dramatic situation, that of nullifica-
tion, Dzur recommends a balanced view: 
This view places nullification in a different light, not as a war
between judge and jury, but as a feedback mechanism whereby
120. DZUR, supra note 110, at 70.
121. Id. at 97.
122. Id. at 70.
123. Id. at 97. 
124. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
113-15 (2006). 
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one part of government signals to another part—the executive
or the legislative—that it has overreached or made a mistake.
Nullification is simply an overly dramatic and derogatory name
for the kind of discretionary power also held by the judge, who
can decide to allow some kinds of evidence but not others, some
lines of questioning but not others, and by the prosecutor, who
can choose not to bring a case to court and who can determine
what precise charges to bring against a defendant.125
In particular, forms of democratic deliberation, including jury
involvement in sentencing, should replace the bureaucratic devices
of plea bargaining:
The efficiency of plea bargaining conceals its true cost, which is
to let the public forget its responsibility for punishment.
Abolition of plea bargaining would force an immediate sobering
up about the multiplicity of actions currently criminalized, the
severity of many sentences, and the massive number and
specific social categories—racial and economic in particular—of
those people caught in the criminal justice net every year. These
are the social costs hidden by plea bargaining. More trials will
cost more in the short term, but the resulting increase in public
responsibility for crime control and criminal justice would
encourage active consideration of other ways of cost cutting,
such as civic learning about how to identify and prevent crimino-
genic circumstances, the possible benefits of decriminalization,
and the potential for community organizing work that rehabili-
tates outside formal state structures. Plea bargaining manages
crime and crime control as a bureaucratic matter, sidestepping
a more democratic understanding of our real world and the
realization of the public work—rather than police, prosecutorial,
and corrections work—that needs to be done.126
And so a revitalized jury trial is likely to improve both the
political maturity of the participants and the quality of outcomes. In
contrast:
[P]rofessionalized, nonparticipatory justice ... prevents citizens
from recognizing and owning up to the extremely difficult moral
125. DZUR, supra note 110, at 136.
126. Id. at 146-47.
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judgments made every day in court, to the discretionary
decisions made by police and prosecutors prior to trial, and, most
fundamentally of all, to the social patterns and cultural under-
standings that make something a crime deserving punishment
and something else a minor fault or lapse in judgment deserving
scolding.127
In our terms, it fosters political immaturity. According to Dzur:
How is it that amidst so much punishment, alongside so many
incarcerated, the free citizens lack disgust or shame? It is, I
think, not the ignorance, lack of professionalism, or the natural
retributivism of the people that is to blame but what Zygmunt
Bauman has termed the “shedding of responsibility” by citizens
as well as officials and managers. Bauman understands systemic
carelessness for others, in this case for those caught up in the
penal system, as a function of forces that destructure social life
such that links to others and our responsibility for them are
invisible.... While state action conceived as official action may
have been an answer for some countries, participatory institu-
tions that expect citizens to share responsibility for the criminal
law are a better solution for pluralist and state-skeptical
countries like the United States.128
A jury trial allows citizens to “own up to their laws.” Dzur
quoted E.P. Thompson:
The jury box is where people come into the court; the judge
watches them and the jury watches back.... The jury attends in
judgment, not only upon the accused, but also upon the justice
and humanity of the law.... Justice is not a set of rules to be
“administered” to a people. Verdicts are not “administered”; they
are found. And the findings, as matters of “public importance,”
cannot yet be done by microchip. Men and women must consult
their reasons and their consciences, their precedents and their
sense of who we are and who we have been.129
127. Id. at 94-95.
128. Id. at 162-63.
129. Id. at 162 (quoting THOMPSON, supra note 118, at 107-09).
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CONCLUSION
The American jury trial, viewed from inside, provides the jury
the wherewithal to exercise political judgment wisely. There is every
reason to believe that juries do exercise this judgment, and do so in
a way that is respectful of the values of concern for the individual
litigant and for the stability of the legal order. Arendt came to
understand that. And there is good reason to believe that increasing
the range of jury authority over the criminal justice system will be
much to the good.
